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Abstract 
In this paper I will discuss the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s 
unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679. The memoir  marks a new stage in 
Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this change can be found in Leibniz’s 
rejection of the Cartesian theory of passion and action in the 1670s. His early Aristotelianism 
and some features of Cartesianism persisted to which Leibniz added influences from Hobbes 
and Spinoza. His nascent dynamical concept of substance is seemingly a combination of old 
and fresh influences, representing a characteristically eclectic approach, but I will argue that 
the influence of Hobbes is especially important in the memoir. To do that, I will examine 
Leibniz’s development in the 1670s up to the De affectibus and consider the nature of affects 
in the memoir, especially the first affect which starts the thought sequence. This first affect of 
pleasure or pain is the key to Leibniz’s theory of active substances and in this way to the 
whole of Leibniz’s moral psychology and ethical metaphysics.    
Keywords: Leibniz, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, affect, philosophy of mind, series of 
thoughts, metaphysics, dynamics 
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Affects and Activity in Leibniz’s De Affectibus  
Markku Roinila 
 
The topic of this paper is the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s 
unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679 (A VI, 4, 1410-1441). It is unclear why 
Leibniz wrote the memoir in the first place, but lately it has gained increasing attention as an 
early formulation of his metaphysical dynamism.
1
 While the first half of the text deals mostly 
with the contents of Descartes’s Les passions de l’âme (1649), the second half discusses 
philosophy of mind and metaphysics of emotions and I will concentrate on that latter half of 
the text. 
   De Affectibus marks a new stage in Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this 
change can perhaps be found in Leibniz’s rejection of the Cartesian theory of passion and 
action in the 1670s. His early Aristotelianism and some features of Cartesianism persisted to 
which Leibniz added influences from Hobbes and Spinoza. His nascent dynamical concept of 
substance is seemingly a combination of old and fresh influences, representing a 
characteristically eclectic approach. I will examine Leibniz’s development in the 1670s up to 
the De affectibus and consider the nature of affects in the memoir, especially the first affect 
which starts the thought sequence. This first affect is the key to Leibniz’s theory of active 
substances and in this way it is key to the whole of Leibniz’s moral psychology and ethical 
metaphysics.    
1 Background 
Leibniz was taught traditional Aristotelianism in his university years, but at an early age he 
decided to follow the mechanistic philosophy of the moderns such as Descartes, Gassendi and 
Hobbes. Characteristically he was not quite happy with all the aspects of their philosophy and 
tried to reconcile between the best parts of their systems (Garber 2009a, 5-9). In addition, not 
wanting to part ways with Aristotelianism, he wanted to have a teleological conception of 
substance, that is, he wished to preserve the Aristotelian doctrine of forms despite the ardent 
                                                          
1
 Schepers (2003, 133-135) speculates that by analysing Descartes’s and Spinoza’s views on passions or 
affections Leibniz sought to find material for his planned scientia generalis. Di Bella argues along the same 
lines (2006, 194). As I will argue later, I think Leibniz saw affections as important in his moral philosophy, as 
Elementa juris naturalis of 1671 already shows. Therefore I think that his interest in passions was fired up by 
the need to explain human behavior in general. In the previous year he also read and copied passages from 
Spinoza’s Ethica, parts III-V, noting in his letter to Vincent Placcius of 14. February 1678 that Spinoza had said 
many good things about the affects (A II, 1, 593). 
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opposition of the mechanists.
2
  
   According to Aristotle, active powers enable whatever has them to transmit new forms to 
substances possessing the passive power to receive those forms (Schneewind 2006, 559).
3
 
The conception of metaphysical powers changed in the Early Modern period: they are 
analysed as secondary qualities like colours, tastes or smells, which result from our 
interaction with the world and reduced to only two, action and passion (James 1997, 85).  
   This is central in Descartes’s view. In the Cartesian picture the soul has only one part and 
possesses one power, the power of thinking.
4
 Although willing and understanding occur in 
the soul alone, sensory perceptions, passions, some memories and some fantasies depend on 
the interaction of soul and body. In Les passions de l’âme (1649), §17 he says: 
 
There is nothing in us which we must attribute to our soul except our thoughts. These are of 
two principal kinds, some being actions of the soul and others its passions. Those I call its 
actions are all our volitions…the various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us 
may be called its passions in the general sense, for it is often not our soul which makes them 
such as they are, and the soul always receives them from the things that are represented by 
them (CSM I, 335).  
Passions in one sense are all the functions of the soul that are not actions of the soul or 
volitions (Passions, §28; CSM I, 339). Action and passion are essential in Descartes’ theory 
of mind-body interaction which takes place through the pineal gland and the movements of 
the animal spirits (Passions, §30-37; CSM I, 339-342). Emotions typically have bodily 
manifestations (shame causes blushing etc.) and this is why they cannot be restricted to the 
soul alone.  
   Descartes makes a considerable effort at explaining the passions with the movements of the 
animal spirits (Passions, §160; CSM I, 386-387), but there is a serious problem in the mind-
body interaction which was famously pointed out by Princess Elisabeth, namely, how can a 
mental soul affect the material body? (Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes 6. May 1643, Shapiro 
(2007, 62)). This problem affects the theory of action and passion in the sense that passions 
seem to be complex interpretations (of immanent danger, for example) and thus fruits of 
judgements and inferences in the soul rather than a flow of animal spirits (James 1997, 104-
105). Thus ascribing action to the soul and passion to the body seems to be problematic as the 
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 See, for example, Discours de metaphysique, §10. 
3
 Active powers are potentialities, which are external principles of change or being at rest (Metaphysics 9. 8, 
1049b5–10). Thus they are essential in explaining causes. 
4
 On the nature of the soul, see Second Meditation, CSM II, 19-20. 
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active soul apparently has no direct way to affect the passive body. 
   Like Malebranche, Leibniz could not accept the soul/body-divide of Descartes because of 
these problems and his criticism towards Cartesianism increased in his formative period of 
1672-76 when he was on a diplomatic mission to Paris.
5
 However, he retained some features 
of Cartesianism in his later philosophy, as we will soon see. During the Paris years Leibniz 
was also reflecting on metaphysics, writing, among others, a collection of short notes and 
memoirs now known as De summa rerum (1675-76, A VI, 3, 461-588). One topic essential to 
developing his metaphysics was the nature of substance and the question of activity versus 
passivity. After rejecting most of the Cartesian doctrine he played for a short time with 
Spinozian monism, but in the end he devised a pluralist metaphysics with an infinite number 
of substances. As a consequence, Leibniz had to develop a new understanding of activity and 
passivity. De affectibus is one of his earliest attempts to do that.  
2 The Memoir 
De affectibus, which remained unpublished, was written in April 1679, a few years after 
Leibniz had settled at the Hannover court following his stay in Paris. Before that he had 
carefully read Spinoza’s Opera posthuma in 1678 and found that he could not accept many of 
its central doctrines. The memoir, which can be characterized as working notes (Jones 2006, 
250), begins with a collection of definitions and reflections on Descartes’ theory of the 
passions. Before writing this piece, he had read Les passions de l’âme the previous year and 
briefly copied some parts of it with marginal notes and some underlinings (A VI, 4, 1703-05). 
Of interest is the fact that many points Leibniz wrote down from Descartes’ work concern the 
details of the mind-body union, such as the movement of the pineal gland, the movement of 
the animal spirits, and of how certain passions such as love and joy arise from the movement 
of the spirits.
6
  
   The series of definitions in several groups seem at first to be random, having no relation to 
each other and composing no apparent unity, although the first half of the text loosely follows 
the structure of the Passions. Most definitions concern single affects or characteristics of man 
such as honour, wonder, curiosity, diligence, cupidity etc. (A VI, 4, 1414-1416). They seem 
to be short summaries or reformulations of the ones in Descartes’ Passions as some 
definitions refer to articles of that work. In addition, the text includes a long section of 
                                                          
5
 On Malebranche’s criticism of Descartes’s views, see James (1997, 108-123). On Leibniz’s intellectual 
development in the Paris years, see Antognazza (2008, 139-192) and Mercer (2001, 385-461). 
6
 Leibniz wrote a marginal note on the relationship between love and joy (A VI, 4, 1704). In 1671 he had 
discussed the essence of pure love in Elementa juris naturalis (A VI, 1,  431-485). 
4 
 
definitions of passions copied from Descartes’s work. Thus the first three sections seem to be 
a collection of Cartesian and original alternative definitions of passions.
7
   
   In section D
8
 the tone of the text changes and we are provided with reflections on affects 
and how they influence our actions. While passions and affects are usually thought to be two 
names for the same thing, it is noteworthy that after ceasing to refer to Descartes, Leibniz 
systematically uses the term ‘affect’, familiar especially from Spinoza’s writings. One gets 
the impression that Leibniz turns from the Cartesian theory of passions to Spinoza’s theory of 
affects although it is noteworthy that De affectibus discusses only affects of the mind, not of 
the body. Alluding to Aristotelianism, Leibniz explicitly says that what affect is in the mind, 
impetus is in the body (A VI, 4, 1426). Some emotions are also discussed within this new 
kind of framework. Finally, from section H Leibniz turns to metaphysics proper, discussing 
potentiality, perfection and determination. The text seems to have more backbone and 
systematicity.
9
 Eventually all the previous themes are incorporated in the doctrine of thought 
sequences which are initiated with affects. The essential question seems to be: how are the 
following states of the soul determined, or what brings about change in the substance?  
3 Cartesian and Leibnizian Passions 
One can interpret De affectibus as a remake of Descartes’s Les passions de l’âme (Di Bella 
2005, 99), but this would apply mostly to the first half of the text. It seems that he was just 
collecting what he saw as worthwhile in the Passions in order to utilize them in his new 
understanding of activity and passivity. If this is true, the foremost motivation of the text 
appears to be metaphysical. While Descartes argues that he is treating the passions only as a 
natural philosopher (CSM I, 327), that is, to analyse passions and their causes and see how 
they can be remedied, Leibniz’s goal seems to be to place activity and passivity within a 
framework of plurality of substances. One gets the impression that when he picks up steam, 
he is not really interested in affects per se, but rather in how they motivate the mind. In fact, it 
would seem that for Leibniz, whatever brings about a change in the mind, can be called an 
affect.  
   It is revealing that also in Leibniz’s mature theory of emotions in Nouveaux essais sur 
l’entendement humain II, xx (1704), the most important passions are the same as in De 
affectibus, the ones which have to do with activity and perfection, that is, joy, hope and love 
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 See especially his own definitions in A VI, 4, 1426. 
8
 The division A-J is made by the Academy editors. See A VI, 4, 1410. 
9
 Schepers finds in the last sections of De affectibus a logical structure. See Schepers (2003), especially 152-
160. See also Di Bella (2006, 194). 
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(A VI, 6, 162-168). However, it is also true that Leibniz’s later conception of passions are 
essentially tied to metaphysics in the sense that they either produce pleasure or displeasure of 
the mind and are in that sense related to universal perfection and imperfection.  
   In De affectibus a central motivation is to explain how the states of the mind follow from 
one another. According to Vargas (2011, 178), by April 1679 Leibniz had already formed the 
doctrine of expression, but was still uncertain as to how the mind passes from one thought to 
another. That is why in De affectibus he seeks to explain how affections, understood as 
actions and passions, are produced in the mind.  
    Leibniz starts the memoir by distancing passions from corporeality. Both action and 
passion belong to the mind: passion is some state which is the proximate effect of change 
while action is some state which is the proximate cause of change.
10
 Later in the memoir he 
says: “An action is the state of a thing according to which something does follow, arising 
from its nature . . . A passion is the state of a thing, according to which something is 
prevented from following from its nature.”11  The definitions here refer only to change itself 
in the mind, not their corporeal nature. Sensations of the body such as hunger thus does not 
qualify as an affect.
12
 
   In De affectibus Leibniz defines affect as an occupation or thought of the soul which arises 
out of its opinion on good and evil.
13
 The source of the affect is a feeling of pleasure or pain 
which correspond to our opinion on goodness or evil in the situation. In itself, this is an 
Aristotelian notion — we automatically follow the apparent good – but Goldenbaum (2009, 
199) argues persuasively that Leibniz actually took the doctrine from Hobbes’s De corpore 
(1655) or De homine (1658).
14
 In De affectibus Leibniz relates the thinking of good to several 
other emotions such as love, hope and joy and also to greed and probability of favourable 
outcome (A VI, 4, 1426).  
   Related to the opinion on good and evil is the will because Leibniz defines opinion as a 
volition which follows from an understanding or intellection.
15
 The occupation of the soul is 
an inclination towards something and because volition is involved, the inclination is toward 
                                                          
10
 “Passio est status aliquis qui causa proxima mutationis est” (A VI, 4, 1411). In much later Monadologie of 
1714 Leibniz argues in §49-52 that mutual action and passion among substances is regulated by the pre-
established harmony. In De affectibus Leibniz discusses in terms of individual minds which are either 
spontaneous in the sense that they are active or the opposite case.  
11
 A VI, 4, 1428-1429; translated in Di Bella (2006, 113). 
12
 Compare Passions, §24 (CSM I, 337). Referring to §27-28, Leibniz argues that affects are perceptions which 
are related to the soul and not to the body (A VI, 4, 1418). See also Giolito (1996, 198). 
13
 “Affectus est occupatio animi orta ex sententia animi circa bonum et malum” (A VI, 4, 1412). 
14
 For another account on Hobbes’s influence to Leibniz’s early thought, see McDonald Ross (2007, 20 and 24-
27). I will return to the details of Hobbes’ influence to Leibniz in the next section. 
15
 “Sententia est intellectio ex qua sequitur voluntas” (A VI, 1412).  
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something which is preferred by the understanding.
16
 One might say that volition cannot arise 
without thought and thought cannot arise without reason (Giolito 1996, 197). As Leibniz 
regards the will as an intellectual appetite in the soul, his conception of it is clearly much 
closer to Thomas Aquinas or even Descartes than to Hobbes for whom the will is the last 
desire in deliberation.
17
  
   It is clear that Leibniz does not relate affects to external objects as Descartes does 
(Passions, §53-56; CSM I, 350). They seem to be inherent, occasioned by the sentiment of 
the soul – that is, the external objects as representational content give occasion to an affect, 
but are not directly the cause of them in the same way as in Descartes. Leibniz does say that 
the affection of the mind involves the existence of its objects, but does not really give an 
argument for establishing the external objects (Vargas 2011, 179). The affect disposes us to 
incline into a certain direction which is preferred. It carries, as it were, the soul from one 
reason to another (Giolito 1996, 197-198). In this way it is much more lasting than a 
mechanical cause. 
   In order to see how Leibniz ended up in this position, it is useful to look at his earlier 
writings in the 1670s. Influenced heavily by Hobbes, in Theoria motus abstracti of 1671 he 
stated that every body in collision transfers to the other a conatus equal to its own without 
thereby losing any of its original conatus. The multiple conatuses last only for a moment 
before they are resolved into one (A VI, 2, 265-266).
18
 If they are unequal, the resultant 
conatus will retain the direction of the greatest one, and have for its magnitude the difference 
between the original conatuses (A VI, 2, 269-70).
19
 If the conatuses are equal, they rule each 
other out and another one takes their place. Interesting to our purposes is the fact that Leibniz 
argued that “every body is a momentary mind, or one lacking recollection, because it does 
not retain its own conatus and the other contrary one together for longer than a moment” (A 
VI, 2, 266; Leibniz (1976, 141).
20
  
   The difference between the mind and the body is that the latter lacks thought and memory 
which makes it unable to perceive its own actions and passions (A VI, 2, 266).  To quote Di 
Bella, Leibniz was trying to complete the Hobbesian philosophy of body through a new 
philosophy of mind (Di Bella 2005, 62). This is implicit already in his letter to Hobbes of  
July 1670, where he laments that Hobbes had failed to see the proper significance of the 
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 “Occupatio animi est inclinatio ad aliquid prae alio cogitandum” (A VI, 1412). 
17
 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 6 (1651). At this point Leibniz did not yet have the doctrine of innate instinct of the 
New Essays (I, ii) where we automatically strive for good or pleasure and avoid evil or imperfection. 
18
 On Hobbes’ influence to TMA, see Wilson (1997, 341-343) and Garber (2009a, 15-17). 
19
 See also Garber (2009a, 17-18). 
20
 The doctrine of perceiving bodies is also a debt Leibniz owes to Hobbes. See MacDonald Ross (1997, 27-30).  
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conatus for a true theory of the soul (A II, 1, 58).
21
 
   In De Summa rerum of 1675-1676 Leibniz argues that the solidity or unity of the body 
comes from the mind and there are as many minds as vortices and as many vortices as solid 
bodies (Garber 1998, 781).
22
 At this stage Leibniz still holds on to the Cartesian doctrine of 
extension, but it is implicit that minds are incorporeal substances (Di Bella 2005, 67).
23
 He 
thought that the mind is necessarily added to the matter and this seems to be his view also in 
De affectibus. 
   Another interesting predecessor to De affectibus is 1673 dialogue Confessio philosophi 
where Leibniz argues, much the same way as in his later Nouveaux essais that happiness 
consists of pleasure of the mind and that being delighted is nothing other than experiencing 
harmony and the greatest harmony consists of thinking of the universe or God. Thus pleasure 
is the first step towards happiness as all happiness is harmonious (Leibniz 2005, 30-31). Put 
otherwise, pleasure or judging something to be good is an affect which motivates us to strive 
for harmony. Interestingly, in this text Leibniz does not discuss the will in the human soul as 
in De affectibus. It is said that what a conatus is in a body, an affect is in the mind – thus 
Leibniz held on to the Hobbesian idea of bodies as momentary minds.
24
 However, it must be 
noted that Leibniz explained to Arnauld two years earlier, in 1671, that the conatus of the 
mind is the will (A II, 1, 173).
25
  
   The will as a part of the soul returns to the picture in Elementa verae pietatis of 1677-78
26
 
where Leibniz characterized it as a sentiment concerning good and evil. Sentiment, again, is 
characterized as a practical thought, that is, a thought with a tendency (conatus) toward action 
(Leibniz 2005, 161). Here the idea of an occupation of the soul as a tendency which is related 
to our opinions of good and evil is already in place. What De affectibus introduces is the 
dynamism and teleology of thought sequences.    
 4 Affects and Thought Sequences 
The second half of the De affectibus departs clearly from the Cartesian framework. Leibniz 
discusses a series of thoughts (series cogitationum) which is a continuous series of ideas in 
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 See also Boros (2007, 82-83) and Wilson (1997, 344). In his letter to Arnauld in 1671 Leibniz said that the 
philosophy of motion is a step towards the science of the mind (A II, 1, 278). On Leibniz’s early attempts to 
formulate such a science, see Busche (2004, 142-151). 
22
See also Wilson (1997, 343-344). 
23
See also Leibniz (1992, xlv). 
24
 This view is also present in Theoria motus abstracti, written in the same year. See Busche (2004, 151-153). 
Compare also  De affectibus (A VI, 4, 1426).  
25
 See also Leibniz (2005, 161, n. 101). 
26
 Elementa verae pietatis, sive de amore Dei super omnia (A VI, 4, 1357-1366). 
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the mind. The view is related to the infinite analysis where only God is able to see everything 
in the series as Leibniz noted in the end of De affectibus and in another memoir titled De 
libertate around the same time, where he says:  
It is easily seen from a consideration of the nature of demonstration and analysis that there 
can and must be truths which cannot be reduced by any analysis to identities or to the 
principle of contradiction but which involve an infinite series of reasons which only God can 
see through (Leibniz 1971, 185; Leibniz 1976, 266). 
While in his earlier works Leibniz had argued that pleasure and pain are related to 
experiencing harmony, here he presents the series of thoughts as a law-like process or 
ordered progress of thoughts in the mind which has its origin in the affect of pleasure or 
pain.
27
 Although the series of thoughts might seem like a mechanical one, the difference is in 
the continuity – while in mechanics the cause determines the next state, in the mind the 
sequence lasts a long time and leads to series of changes. Because the first affect is 
intentional (concerning some good or evil which is sought for), the whole series of thoughts 
is teleological. The sequence continues until the desired good or evil is reached or found to be 
unreachable (Di Bella 2005, 100-101). The process can be quite intense and Leibniz 
compares its ending to waking up from a dream (A VI, 4, 1425-1426).
28
 Different series can 
also rival each other and we can abandon one series in order to follow another (A VI, 4, 
1424).  
   The determination of the series does not happen mechanically, but by some kind of power 
or force. At the time Leibniz was beginning to develop his theory of dynamics; an indication 
of this is his definition of determination in De affectibus: “Determination is a state from 
which something does follow [sequitur], provided that nothing else prevents it” (A VI, 4, 
1426; translated in Di Bella (2005, 104)). Thus determination is an inclination, a tendency, 
conatus. It is also an action in the sense that something follows from its nature. Leibniz 
illustrates this idea in De Affectibus with an example of a body which falls towards the center 
of the earth. When the body stops for a moment because of an obstace and then continues 
falling on the same path (according to a certain physical law) once the obstacle is taken away, 
then it is very close to spontaneity (A VI, 4, 1428-1429). In other words, its falling follows 
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 “Series est multitudo cum ordinis regula” (A VI, 4, 1426). See also A VI, 1424. 
28
An interesting comparison can be made to Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §47 where Leibniz argues that we cannot 
affect our moral action directly, but we should reject our bad habits and adopt new ones in order to reach virtue. 
The habit is in a sense a series of thoughts which can be maintained by strong willing and developing the 
understanding (A VI, 6, 195-197). See also Roinila (2006) and Jones (2006, 252-261). 
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from its nature spontaneously. One can see here a very early and limited version of a doctrine 
of substantial forms which Leibniz gave in his Systeme Nouveau of 1695, where he described 
their source of action as follows: “Aristotle calls them first entelechies; I call them, perhaps 
more intelligibly, primitive forces, which contain not only act or the completion of 
possibility, but also an original activity” (Leibniz 1989, 139).  
   Di Bella has argued that the developing of a serial, abstract and impersonal dimension 
reflects a distinct Spinozian influence. The series of thoughts is comparable to series of things 
or series of determinations in the world and the substance unfolds in a kind of logical way (Di 
Bella 2005, 100-103).
29
 The first affect determines the whole series and its effect lasts until a 
contrary, stronger affect is encountered. Following Fichant, Di Bella argues that by 1679 
Leibniz had already found his basic concept of force and for that reason, he had stopped 
thinking of bodies as momentary minds and shifted to a dynamical view which makes it 
possible to form continuous series of thoughts (Di Bella 2005, 103).
30
 
   While this seems to be a possible reading of De affectibus, it seems to me that there might 
be an alternative interpretation. The foremost other influence I can think of is Hobbes.
31
 In 
De corpore (1655) and De homine (1658) Hobbes had developed a theory of affects where 
good is strived after, and evil is avoided. These are identified with pleasure and pain and 
conatus is identified with the beginning of motion (EW I, 406-410).
32
 These definitions 
provide Leibniz with the basic tools for creating his theory of series of thoughts. In addition, 
one can find a predecessor to the idea of series of thoughts in Hobbes’s “trayne of thoughts” 
in Leviathan, I, 3 (1651) where he says: “By consequence, or trayne of thoughts, I understand 
that succession of one thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from discourse in 
words) Mentall Discourse” (EW III, 11).   
   Hobbes regards the train of thoughts a mental discourse of which there are of two kinds. 
The first is unguided and inconstant wherein there is no passionate thought (for example, 
dreams). The second kind is more constant and it is regulated by some desire and design (EW 
III, 12-13). The latter kind of process is remarkably similar to Leibniz’s series of thoughts in 
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 I think Di Bella is right in the sense that in Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (1662?), sec. 85 Spinoza 
argues that an objective effect proceeds in the soul according to the formal nature of its object. Thus the soul 
acts according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton. See Spinoza (1985, 37). It is also true that Leibniz 
continued to use this description of the soul in many of his later writings, for example in Monadologie, §18. 
However, he does not use the concept in De affectibus and, as I argue, I think the primary influence can also be 
Hobbes. See also Monadologie, §37 and Principes de la nature et de la grace, fondés en raison, §8. 
30
 For Fichant’s argument, see Leibniz 1994. For a critical view on Fichant’s argument, see Garber (2009b).  
31
 In this, I am inspired by Goldenbaum’s article on Leibniz’s early fascination with Hobbes’s views (2009, 193-
196). 
32
 Hobbes discusses series of appetites and aversions which form passions such as hope or fear. On Hobbes’ 
views on affects, see also De homine XI, 5 and XIII, 1. 
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De affectibus, although Leibniz added will to the picture. The thought is suggested by the 
understanding and preferred by the will. This opinion is an inclination, a desire, a disposition.  
    According to De Gaudemar, in 1676 Leibniz strived to replace the Hobbesian conatus with 
a doctrine of entelechy or primitive power. Thought is seen as action and essences of things 
consist in a law of acting, analogous to a mathematical series. The primitive power of the 
mind manifests in its ability to pass through different thoughts without getting stuck in one 
thought. This ability was enabled by feelings of pleasure or pain to which the will attaches as 
Leibniz already argued in his 1673 dialogue Confessio philosophi (De Gaudemar 2009, 
179).
33
  
   While it would seem that Leibniz has transferred the Hobbesian conatus from the body to 
the mind, in De affectibus Leibniz also says that the first affect serves the same role in the 
soul as impetus in the body.
34
 This leads us to Aristotelianism – in the doctrine of impetus or 
an impulsion of a body to motion the body is only maintained in motion by the action of a 
continuous external force (Pasnau 2011, 381-382).  
   Although I think the influence of Hobbes is prominent in De affectibus, Leibniz introduces 
an element in the memoir which is distinctly Cartesian or Spinozian. He argues that the series 
we are thinking can arise either from distinct ideas (of causes, for example) or from confused 
ideas when there are many inclinations present at the same time.
35
 This emphasis on 
confusedness or distinctness of the starting point of a series distances Leibniz from Hobbes 
and makes one think of Spinoza who, in E3p1d, related affects to the adequacy and 
inadequacy of ideas (Spinoza 1985, 493-494). Especially this passage in De affectibus would 
be related to the distinctness or confusedness of the first affects:  
We are caused [determinati sumus] to pursue some series of thoughts, either because we are 
already in it, nor is there a reason for changing; or because we come to a crossroads where 
many series of thoughts meet, one of them being the strongest of all (A VI, 4, 1434; translated 
in Di Bella 2005, 102).
36
  
The citation exemplifies the mechanical character of the memoir: the mind proceeds like an 
automaton, one thought following from another, sometimes branching to several related paths 
                                                          
33
 See also Goldenbaum (2009, 199). 
34
 “Affectus est in animo, quod impetus in corpore” (A VI, 4, 1426). See also Schepers (2003, 135). 
35
 “Series cogitandi oritur vel ex ideis distinctis…vel oritur ex ideis confusis” (A VI, 4, 1424-1425). This 
passage clearly anticipates NE II, xxi, §39. 
36
Although Leibniz does not discuss the topic more extensively, one can easily relate this idea to the classic 
problem of  akrasia or weakness of the will. We are taken by a more vivid thought which leads us to another 
train of thoughts. The goal, of course, is to turn human attention to the most perfect series. See Leibniz’s later 
discussion of akrasia in NE, II, xxi, §35 (A VI, 6, 185-188). 
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or coming to a crossroads where the same thought can lead in several directions (Di Bella 
2005, 102-103).
37
   
   However, one can – and I think, should - read De affectibus on a more personal level. In 
this reading we have to compare the series of thoughts to each other. The idea seems to be 
that the more distinct the series, the more it involves reality or perfection and the more 
certainly we continue in the series without being transferred into another series (A VI, 4, 
1425, 1428 & 1433).
 
For example, if we follow a series of confused thoughts and come 
across an intersection where a common thought branches into a more distinct series of 
thoughts, we ought to abandon our present series and follow the more distinct series. The 
series of thoughts which is initiated by a distinct perception is a clear and recognizable path 
which is superior to all the concurrent, hardly visible tracks in its vicinity. Leibniz does in 
fact say that in our initial choice we prefer the series of thoughts which appears to us to be 
more perfect than other series. In cases where there are intersections, some path is preferred 
by the will, but the choice is founded on the understanding. 
   The role of the will is more vague in De affectibus than in Leibniz’s later writings, although 
it is clearly a necessary and independent part of the soul.
38
 We saw that he defined opinion as 
a volition which follows the understanding, but he does not really present volitions as actions 
which create new thoughts. Rather, the cause of a thought is another previous thought in the 
series (Vargas 2011, 178-179). Willing is to be understood here as preferring, inclining to one 
rather than another initial endeavour. This relates Leibniz to the intellectualism of Thomas 
Aquinas where the will usually follows the recommendations of the intellect (James 1997, 
60-62) and  distinguishes him from both Descartes, who emphasized the independence of the 
will (Losonsky 2001, 12-41), and Hobbes, who thought volition is the last endeavour in 
deliberation, be it desire or aversion. According to this view, there is no independent criteria 
of preferring the one to another (EW III, 48-49).  
   There is no reason to doubt that Leibniz continued to think in the same way as in Confessio 
philosophi and Elementa verae pietatis that the first affect is a sentiment of good or evil, that 
is, pleasure or pain. Leibniz understands pleasure or pain as an inclination or a tendency of 
the mind to pass to another state or thought, or to a train or series of thoughts.
39
 As we saw, 
                                                          
37
 Of branching, see Blank in this volume,  CROSS-REFERENCE 
38
 See, for example, Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §21-30 (A VI, 6, 181-183). 
39
 Giolito compares the Leibnizian affect to Cartesian internal emotions of the soul which he discusses in 
Passions, §147 (CSM I, 381). These are produced in the soul itself and are therefore not dependent on the 
movement of the animal spirits, although they may be aroused by external events such as a tragic play. 
However, the Cartesian intellectual passions are defined as particular passions, while Leibniz’s affect is general 
by nature. See Giolito (1996, 201-202).  
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Leibniz held to the Aristotelian view that we always strive toward the apparent good. He also 
agreed with Descartes (and Aristotle) in his later writings that strong willing helps us to act 
virtuously.
40
    
   Considering the will as an essential part of the soul distances Leibniz not only from 
Hobbes, but also from Spinoza. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza thinks that there is no faculty of 
the will in the mind. He argued that the will is closely related to desire which is conscious 
striving of the mind and the body and represents conatus (E3p9s).
41
 In itself, will is a thought, 
identical to an idea and related to the causal chain of substances and subject to its laws. In De 
affectibus, the will follows the understanding (A VI, 4, 1412), but is still separated from it. 
This preferring is nothing like the Spinozian general desire although sometimes Leibniz also 
discusses the will as a general endeavour which is related to activity and perfection. Compare 
Nouveaux essais:  
Volition is the effort or endeavour [conatus] to move towards what one finds good 
and away from what one finds bad, the endeavour arising immediately out of one’s 
awareness of those things. This definition has as a corollary in the famous axiom that 
from will and power together, action follows; since any endeavour results in action 
unless it is prevented (NE II, xxi, §5; A VI, 6, 72; Leibniz 1996, 72).
42
  
In addition, Leibniz himself commented on Spinoza’s views to Oldenbourg in 1675-76, 
arguing that the will is something essential in the soul, not only a verbal or nominalist way of 
thinking (De Gaudemar 2009, 185). While in De affectibus the thoughts seem to follow from 
each other in a sense automatically, the first affect or disposition seems to be essential as it 
inclines one to perfection or imperfection. For this reason, I think the will is an essential 
component in the thought series and this distinguishes Leibniz clearly from Spinoza.  
   Another clear difference is Spinoza’s mind-body-parallelism which Leibniz was keen to 
criticize. In Spinoza’s philosophy the mind and the body are attributes of the same substance, 
God or nature. Both are driven by continuous causal chains which do not directly affect each 
other and both are produced by God. While Leibniz thought that minds are the forms of 
                                                          
40
 See, for example, NE II, xxi, §47. See also Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics VII. 
41
See also Nadler (2006, 200).  
42
 Leibniz argues in much the same way in an appendix to Essais de theodicée, titled Remarques sur le livre de 
l’origine du mal, publié depuis peu en Angleterre: “No agent is capable of acting without being predisposed to 
what the action demands; and the reasons or inclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that 
enable the soul to decide between various courses…the truth is that the soul, or the thinking substance, 
understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, and decides according to the predominance of the 
representations modifying its active force, in order to shape the action.” (Leibniz (1978, 416); Leibniz (2005, 
421)). 
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bodies, Spinoza argued that the mind is an idea of a body (E3p12; Spinoza 1985, 502). This 
Leibniz criticized already in De summa rerum of 1676 and in his marginal notes to Spinoza’s 
Opera Posthuma of 1678 (A VI, 4, 1713, n. 21; 1714, n. 22; 1715, n. 28 and 1723, n. 45). As 
we remember, De affectibus discusses exclusively the mind while Spinoza’s theory of affects 
in Ethica concerns both the mind and the body simultaneously. For these reasons I am 
inclined to think that Hobbes’s theory of affects and the doctrine of trains of thoughts as a 
mental discourse was a more important influence for Leibniz than Spinoza, although 
Leibniz’s views on deliberation and will are certainly closer to Descartes than to Hobbes.  
 
5 Perfection, Action and Passion 
 
We have seen that the first affect starts thought sequences or trains of thought which can rival 
each other in the sense that the mind may abandon one series and adopt another. While this 
picture seems to me to be Hobbesian, Leibniz introduces still further element which is 
Spinozian, namely perfection. In itself, the idea of perfection is not novel in Leibniz’s 
writings. It can be found already in Elementa juris naturalis of 1671, where perceiving 
pleasure in another person is said to be a sensation of perfection. In Confessio philosophi of 
1673 Leibniz was discussing harmony which produces pleasure in the mind. In De affectibus 
Leibniz says that the soul is determined towards the series of thoughts which in itself is most 
perfect.
 43
 He also argues that perfection is a degree of reality (A VI, 4, 1429).   
   In De affectibus Leibniz does not emphasize the metaphysical pluralist framework which is 
so typical of his writings. But he certainly had it in place long before 1679.
44
 For example, in 
a dialogue with Steno concerning freedom of 7. December 1677, he wrote: “If all possible 
series were equally perfect, then it would follow that even one in which all the impious are 
saved and all the pious are damned would be equally perfect.” Therefore it is clear that some 
series of thought are better than others and he counters the argument by saying that it is 
contrary to perfection in the sense that it is possible in itself, but carrying it out becomes 
impossible because it is contrary to God’s perfection (Leibniz 2005, 115).45  
   The concept of perfection in De affectibus is also used as a standard of comparison, but 
from the first-person perspective of the self – one is supposed to enter into a series which 
appears to be more perfect than other available series. Leibniz does not discuss God’s will in 
                                                          
43
 “Determinatur animus ad eam seriem cogitationum quae in se spectata perfectior est” (A VI, 4, 1430). 
44
 On the development of Leibniz’s views of harmony, see Mercer (2001, 208-220). 
45
 Leibniz also argues that the series of things is not necessary by an absolute necessity as there are many other 
series that are possible, i.e. intelligible, even if they are not actually performed. See Leibniz (2005, 119). 
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the memoir until the very end where an idea of series of a series pops up in connection with 
spontaneity, which, as we saw, is seen as a natural unfolding of the series (A VI, 4, 1430). An 
early version of a concept containment theory can also be found in the very end of De 
affectibus (A VI, 4, 1441).
46
 
   The natural unfolding of the series is closely related to action and passion. As we have 
seen, Leibniz is more interested in actions than passions in the Cartesian sense.
47
 In A VI, 4, 
1428 he defined action as a state of thing to which something follows, arising from its nature. 
Thus action is related to the new concept of spontaneity,
 which in Leibniz’s philosophy 
becomes an essential component of freedom (Di Bella 2005, 114-115).
48
 It is also evident that 
spontaneity is related to distinct perceptions as Leibniz says that the less in following this 
regress we come across a passive state, the more spontaneous and natural we consider a 
process (A VI, 4, 1430). We can see that Leibniz is closer here to Spinoza than to either 
Descartes or Hobbes, as action refers to the substance itself, and not to any kind of 
communication between two different kinds of entities.
49
 For Spinoza, going back along the 
causal chains of the substance leads us to see that the substance is its own dynamical source 
of action. However, whereas Spinoza sees action as part of the universal law, Leibniz allows 
the principle of action to each substance of which there is an infinite number. This view, 
however, is not very prominent in De affectibus.  
   In addition, Leibniz maintains that determination can be both pure action or mixed with a 
passion (A VI, 4, 1429). To my mind, this view anticipates a feature essential in Leibniz’s 
later conception of emotions as a ratio of pleasure versus displeasure. In Nouveaux essais II, 
xx, §7 he argues that one can be joyful when tortured (A VI, 6, 166). This marks a substantial 
difference to Spinoza’s view where joy is a transition from lesser perfection to greater 
perfection.
50 
 
                                                          
46
 See also Di Bella (2005, 127). 
47
 For Descartes, passions are related to the fundamental difference between the soul and the body. See 
Passions, §2 (CSM I, 328). 
48
 On this topic, see Rutherford & Cover (2005).  
49
 Martha Kneale presents five different definitions on action and passion which she suggest were influenced by 
reading Spinoza. See Kneale (1976, 220-222).  
50
 In Leibniz’s mature view, the process of action and passion are atemporal although he sometimes sounds a lot 
like Spinoza. For example, in NE II, xxi, 72 he says: “If we take ‘action’ to be an endeavor towards perfection, 
and ‘passion’ to be the opposite, then genuine substances are active only when their perceptions… are becoming 
better developed and more distinct, just as they are passive only when their perceptions are becoming more 
confused. Consequently, in substances which are capable of pleasure and pain every action is a move towards 
pleasure, every passion a move towards pain” (A VI, 6, 210; Leibniz (1996, 210)). See also Monadologie §49 
and  Principes de la nature et de la grâce, §3. 
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Conclusion  
 
De affectibus is an interesting although fragmentary memoir on the philosophy and history of 
the  mind. While the first half of the text is related to Descartes’s Les passions de l’âme, in 
the second half Leibniz drafts a presentation of how the mind works. From the first affect of 
pleasure or pain, suggested by the understanding and preferred by the will, follows a mental 
series which continues until an opposite affect is encountered. Each series is independent of 
the other and therefore they can rival each other. The series can, however, be compared with 
the standard of perfection. While this view and some other elements in De affectibus seem to 
be close to Spinoza, I have argued that the basic structure of the doctrine is in place in 
Leibniz’s earlier writings and heavily influenced by Hobbes and Aristotle. I am inclined to 
think with Martha Kneale that the certain similarities between Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s views 
are due to common origin rather than direct influence (Kneale 1976, 236). This common 
origin is the philosophy of Hobbes.  
   The view of action and passion presented in De affectibus is related to all of the essential 
components of a Leibnizian metaphysics – what is left for further development after the 
memoir is the advanced mind-body theory, a mature theory of dynamics and the theory of 
pre-established harmony. The pre-established harmony is especially important, for in his 
mature theory of emotions Leibniz argues that the soul is often affected through the passions 
of the body.  
   In De affectibus it is left open how the series of thoughts are affected by external objects. 
The series are rather separate continuums which are occasioned by some pleasure or pain and 
the change comes only when an opposite series of thoughts is encountered. The theory of 
expression was already presented in De summa rerum of 1676, so it is difficult to say why 
Leibniz does not use it in the memoir instead of discussing it in an apparently Spinozian 
manner. Perhaps this fact together with his efforts at defining emotions within the framework 
of series of thoughts suggest that De affectibus was, after all, a draft on emotions rather than 
on metaphysics.
51
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